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arry Summers has invoked old theories of secular stagnation to explain the 
persistence of low interest rates in the recent past. The German economist Carl 
Christian von Weizsäcker has pointed to a retirement savings glut as the cause 
for low rates.  
Both theses, however – that of secular stagnation and of a retirement savings glut - 
are theoretically doubtful and not supported by empirical evidence A more plausible 
explanation for sluggish growth and low interest rates in recent years is the fall-out 
from the recent credit boom-bust cycle. 
Larry Summers’ most famous predecessor as prophet of secular stagnation was Alvin 
Hansen. Against the background of the Great Depression of the 1930s, he published 
his thesis in a 1938 book, just one year before the US economy took off on a high, 
long-term growth path.  
In a slightly rambling speech to the attendees of the IMF’s Economic Forum on 8 
November 2013, Larry Summers wondered whether theories of ‘secular stagnation’ 
were possibly relevant for understanding the performance of the US economy. In his 
view, the US economy has behaved as if “the short-term real interest rate that was 
consistent with full employment had fallen to -2% or -3% sometime in the middle of 
the last decade”. If this were the ‘new normal’, Summers felt that “we may well need, 
in the years ahead, to think about how we manage an economy in which the zero 
nominal interest rate is a chronic and systemic inhibitor of economic activity, holding 
our economies back below potential”. 
One probably has to be Larry Summers to be able to trigger a debate with such vague 
comments, which were even qualified by the self-critical observation that “this may 
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all be madness, and I may not have this right”.1 But this is what he did. Fellow New 
Keynesian Paul Krugman in his New York Times column from 16 November joined 
in enthusiastically: “I’ve been thinking along the same lines, and have, I think, hinted 
at this analysis in various writings. But Larry’s formulation is much clearer and more 
forceful, and altogether better, than anything I’ve done.” And there were numerous 
blogs subsequently dedicated to this question. Clearly, Larry Summers has struck a 
nerve. If his musings were not “madness” the world would a very different place 
from what we believe it to be. An economic environment with negative real interest 
rates on a sustained basis would require very different economic policies and 
investment strategies from those we have become accustomed to. The experience of 
the last five years following the collapse of Lehman Brothers would no longer be a 
temporary aberration in the wake of a balance sheet recession but rather the dawn of 
a new economic era. Before we jump to drastic conclusions, however, the thesis of 
secular negative real interest rates deserves critical scrutiny. 
The “old-age provision nightmare” 
Apart from triggering predictable support by fellow New Keynesians such as 
Krugman, Summers’ thesis of negative real interest rates was well received by the 
German economist Carl Christian von Weizsäcker and his followers.2 Von 
Weizsäcker has developed a more sophisticated argument for negative real interest 
rates based on population aging. He starts out with the observation that people in the 
industrialised countries and China today spend some two decades in retirement. 
Therefore, the pensioners need to cover consumption needs for about 10 years on 
average (with those beginning retirement needing funds to cover 20 years of 
consumption and those ending it 0 years). 
Assuming that people wish to bequeath some wealth to their children, von 
Weizsäcker reckons that people require wealth covering about 12 years of 
consumption. At the same time, he estimates that it is technically impossible to build 
an economically efficient productive capital stock covering more than five years of 
consumption. As a result of the excess of the desired stock of savings over the 
economically efficient productive capital stock, von Weizsäcker expects substantial 
mal-investment leading to negative real returns on invested capital. He dubs the 
need to invest at negative rates so as to secure consumption in retirement as the “old-
age provision nightmare”. In von Weizsäcker’s view, the only way to avoid capital 
waste leading to negative real interest rates is an increase in government borrowing. 
To stabilise real rates at zero, government debt needs to fill the gap between the 
desired stock of savings and the maximum possible economically efficient 
productive capital stock. The government’s ability to tax and redistribute income will 
cover the shortfall of consumption afforded by the productive capital stock below the 
desired level of consumption. 
                                               
1 This disclaimer may have been a bit coquettish. Summers repeated his thesis at the 2014 
annual meeting of the American Economic Association, suggesting that he feels that he is 
right and not mad (“Stagnation -- The New Normal”, 4 January 2014). 
2 See, for instance, “Der Vorsorge Albtraum“; Wirtschaftsdienst, 2013, pp. 7-15. 
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According to this view, it is the lack of government borrowing that has pushed real 
interest rates into negative territory. This does not mean that there is no upper limit 
to government borrowing. In case the government borrows more than is necessary to 
fill the gap between the desired savings and economically efficient productive capital 
stock, real rates could rise due to a risk premium for eventual government 
insolvency. Such over-borrowing may have occurred in some euro-area countries 
that recently have experienced difficulties in accessing capital markets. 
A critical look at the von Weizsäcker thesis 
Von Weizsäcker bases his argument on the capital theory of 19th century economist 
Böhm-Bawerk. In contrast to neoclassical theory, where capital is implicitly treated as 
a homogenous fund readily available for the investor, Böhm-Bawerk (BB) defines 
capital as goods “of higher order” required to produce “low-order” consumer goods. 
Thus, in his theory, the production of capital takes time and is specific with regard to 
the production of a defined set of consumer goods. Should this set change, a new 
capital structure may be required. The basic idea behind BB’s theory is shown in a 
simplified form in Figure 1. The horizontal axis gives the value of production, the 
vertical axis the order of goods and stages of production. In the first stage, 10 units of 
the capital goods of 5th order are produced using labour and natural resources. 
Assuming that 9 units are paid to the primary factors, the capital-goods producer 
keeps 1 unit, giving him roughly a 10% rate of return on his outlay (or more precisely 
1/9). The 10 units are sold to the producer of 4th-order goods who adds 5 units in 
value added and keeps a profit of 1.5 units, and so on. The total value of production 
is 100 units, value added is 30 units, profits are 10 units and the return to capital is 
roughly 10%. 
Figure 1. Production structure in the Böhm-Bawerk model 
 
Now assume that the production structure becomes more capital-intensive. This 
means in the BB model that the production process is extended by the addition of 
more higher-order goods, with a view to having more first-order consumer goods in 
the end. Von Weizsäcker now argues that the extension of the production structure 
will necessarily lead to diminishing profits at each stage and, when it is driven too 
far, to losses. In his view, the limit kicks in long before the level of first-order 
consumer goods production has been reached to feed the large group of retirees. He 
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bases his view on the observation that estimates of the productive capital stock are 
equivalent to more than five years of consumption while the required productive 
capital stock should be able to produce consumer goods worth twelve years of 
consumption. 
But are these assumptions and estimates sufficiently robust to justify a prediction of 
overinvestment and negative real interest rates? For one thing, retirement periods 
may decline as more people grow older. Medical progress and less strenuous work 
will probably extend the working age life along with the total life span. For another, 
technical progress may allow the deepening of the production structure and an 
increase in the capital stock (in terms of years of consumption) without the feared 
decline in capital returns. In short, the uncertainty about key parameters in the von 
Weizsäcker thesis is too great to allow robust predictions of future real interest rates. 
A theoretical argument against real interest rates below the real growth rate of the 
economy has been advanced by Stefan Homburg from Hannover University.3 
Homburg draws on the 19th century French physiocrat Jacques Turgot, who argued 
that the rent on land would represent a lower boundary for real interest rates. 
Moreover, in a growing economy, the total real return on land (which is in fixed 
supply) must increase with the growth rate of the economy. If real interest rates are 
pushed below the real growth rate, it pays to take out credit to buy land. The price of 
land rises above the level consistent with a real return in line with real economic 
growth as long as the gap between the real interest and growth rates persists. The 
bubble bursts when real interest and growth rates are realigned.  
No smoking gun 
Scepticism about theories of secular negative real interest rates is reinforced by the 
historical empirical evidence.  
Summers inferred the possibility that the short-term real interest rate had fallen to     
-2% or -3% from the lacklustre performance of the economy and low inflation despite 
strongly expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. However, there is no evidence 
that real long-term rates in the US have been depressed recently in a way that is 
inconsistent with historical experience. Figure 2 shows the long-term (over 10 years) 
average US Treasury bond yield adjusted with the consumer price inflation rate. At 
1.9% in the third quarter of 2013, the real rate does not seem to be unusually low by 
historical comparison. Between 1946 and 1952, there were phases of strongly 
negative real rates. Real rates were also negative, albeit not as much as earlier, 
between 1977 and 1981. In the first period, the economy grew strongly, in the second 
only weakly. In both periods, however, inflation was at elevated levels.  
Real rates jumped in the early 1980s as the Volcker Federal Reserve raised policy 
rates to fight inflation. Subsequently, they eased again and dipped briefly into 
negative territory in 2008. But this episode was very short-lived and much milder 
than the earlier episodes of negative real rates. 
                                               
3 See http://www.coll.mpg.de/Download/Weizsaecker/Debatte%20Staatsschulden.pdf for 
the entire debate. 
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Figure 2. US real long-term yield on Treasury bonds  
 
Moreover, the von Weizsäcker thesis would require global savings (and investment) 
to run at increasingly high levels, especially in regions with a more rapidly ageing 
population. As Figure 3 shows, however, there is no evidence for this either. 
According to IMF calculations, aggregate savings have declined relative to GDP in 
the advanced countries since the end of the 1990s. At the same time, however, they 
increased sharply in the group of emerging market economies. With populations in 
the emerging market economies much younger than in the advanced economies 
during this period, the opposite should have happened, if von Weizsäcker’s thesis 
would hold. 
Figure 3. Global savings 
 
An alternative view 
Let’s return to Summers’ conundrum that significant stimulus from macroeconomic 
policy even before the financial crisis of 2007-09 failed to produce more vigorous 
economic growth and inflation. Is not this the smoking gun in favour of the 
argument of secular stagnation and negative real interest rates? Followers of the New 
Keynesian economic model may well find no other explanation for the failure of the 
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economy to react more powerfully to expansionary economic policies. But another 
theory, the Austrian school, would predict exactly that. 
According to two of its most prominent proponents, F.A. Hayek and Ludwig von 
Mises, an investment and asset price cycle is started when economic policy pushes 
the real funding rate below the real natural rate, which balances savings and 
investment in the long term. Low interest rates raise the price of existing capital 
goods and induce investors to expand the production of new capital goods (adding 
more goods of higher order to the production structure, as shown in Figure 1). At the 
same time, lower funding rates discourage savings and encourage consumption and 
the production of consumer goods. Both consumer and capital goods industries 
begin to expand. However, after a while, primary resources and funds become scarce 
so that wages, prices for intermediate goods and interest rates rise. Capital asset 
prices decline and a lack of resources and funding leads to the failure of marginal 
projects. Economic growth resumes only after capital asset prices have fully corrected 
and mal-investment has been eliminated. If economic policy counters the necessary 
adjustment by lowering funding rates and pumping new funds into the system, the 
production structure remains inefficient and the economy will not be able to return 
to healthy growth. Thus, continuous economic policy stimulus will achieve little 
more than keeping the economy in a state of stagnation. 
Since the late 1980s, monetary policy has been the instrument of choice to counter 
economic downswings in the wake of asset price crashes. The series began with the 
equity market crash of 1987, which was countered with aggressive monetary policy 
easing by the US Federal Reserve and other important central banks. The US savings 
and loan crisis and subsequent recession of the early 1990s and the emerging market 
and LTCM crisis of the late 1990s triggered further rounds of monetary easing. More 
easing followed the burst of the technology stock price bubble in 2000 and, of course, 
the burst of the credit bubble in 2007. As a result, the Federal Funds target rate 
adjusted for inflation declined on trend between the early 1980s and 2013. During the 
entire period, the real Fed Funds’ rate averaged +1.6%. From 2008, the second year of 
the financial crisis, to end-2013 it averaged -1.5%. 
Figure 4. US: Real Fed Funds’ target rate 
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To Larry Summers’ puzzlement, year-on-year GDP growth averaged 3.7% during the 
recovery of the 1990s, 2.4% during the recovery in the first half of the 2000s and only 
1.8% since the trough of the Great Recession in the first half of 2009. An increasingly 
more expansionary monetary policy has been accompanied by an ever-weaker 
economic recovery. Larry Summers concludes from this that the economy has 
entered a phase of secular stagnation, characterised by excessive savings and too few 
investment opportunities. Others might conclude that the medicine against 
hangovers may have become less effective after so many wild parties. 
Conclusion 
Larry Summers’ theory of secular stagnation is not new. As mentioned in the 
introduction, the US economist Alvin Hansen argued in the late 1930s, against the 
background of the Great Depression, that the American economy would never grow 
rapidly again because all the growth ingredients had played out, including 
technological innovation and population growth.4 “Secular stagnation” had set in. 
The only solution, he found, was large-scale deficit spending by the federal 
government, just as Summers argued in a follow-up article to his earlier secular 
stagnation thesis.5 Secular stagnation was in Hansen’s view just another name for 
Keynes's underemployment equilibrium. Hansen’s book appeared in 1938, two years 
before the US economy embarked upon a powerful expansion, with real GDP 
growing at an annual average rate of almost 5% between 1938 and 1973. Growth in 
the early 1940s was related to a surge in government spending due to WWII and 
seemingly in line with Hansen’s theory. What went against Hansen’s thesis was the 
continuation of growth in the post-war period. 
With hindsight, it seems that Hansen mistook the ‘hangover’ during the 1930s from 
the roaring twenties that culminated in the stock market crash of 1929 for secular 
stagnation. It seems likely, that Larry Summers is making the same mistake. Policies 
based on such a mistaken view could prove quite dangerous. 
 
                                               
4 Alvin Hansen, Full Recovery or Stagnation?, New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 1st edition, 
1 January 1938. 
5 See Larry Summers, “Washington must not settle for secular stagnation”, Financial Times, 6 
January 2014. 
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